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Michael C. Dorf’s “Review” of 
Richard A. Posner, Divergent Paths: The 
Academy and the Judiciary1
A Response by the Book’s Author
The editor of this journal has invited me to write a rejoinder to Professor 
Dorf’s review—which I am happy to do although “rejoinder” is more 
antagonistic than I am inclined to be in commenting on his review. Much 
of it I either agree with or can’t see much profi t in disagreeing with. And I 
am fl attered by his references to my judicial opinions dealing with supervised 
release and same-sex marriage. But I don’t think that his piece is accurately 
characterized as a book review, because a book review is expected to give the 
reader of the review an idea of the scope and contents of the book, and Dorf 
doesn’t do that. You would not guess from the review that Appendix D of 
my book2 lists 75 problems of the federal judi ciary and 48 possible academic 
solutions, all touched on in the book. Dorf mentions few of either the problems 
or the solutions. I would not expect any reviewer of my book to discuss 123 
problems and suggested solutions. But Dorf’s “review” fails to convey an 
accurate picture of the book to his readers. Nor are all his criticisms on the 
mark, as I shall now try to show.
In footnote 15 of his piece Dorf describes as “petty” my criticizing the 
frequent misspelling by lawyers and judges of the Latin phrase de minimis non 
curat lex (the law doesn’t concern itself with trifl es) as de minimus non curat lex. If 
minimis were the only, or one of a handful, of words that lawyers and judges 
frequently misspell, my drawing attention to the misspelling would indeed 
be petty. But as Dorf fails to mention, that word is only one of a number 
of words and phrases that I criticize on pages 123 and 124 of my book, all 
being words and phrases that appear frequently in briefs, judicial opinions, 
and law review articles. I do not consider these criticisms of what amounts to 
systematic bad legal writing “cranky,” as he contends, or my criticisms of the 
1. Richard A. Posner, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY, Cambridge, Mass., 
London: Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 414, $29.95.
2. Id. at 361-68.
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Bluebook and of much else regarding legal composition as “cranky.” I would 
like to see him defend the Bluebook—its length (560 pages),3 its cost (~$36),4 
its unintelligible abbreviations (guess what words “Auth.” “Auto.,” “Broad.,” 
“Bhd.,” “Ent.,” “Prot.,” “Res.,” and “Unif.” are Bluebook abbreviations of), its 
opacity, its superfl uity. The handbook that I give my law clerks contains fi ve 
pages on citation format; that’s enough.
Very strangely—quite mischaracterizing my book—Dorf implies that I tried 
but failed through “pointed criticisms” of Justice Scalia “during the last years 
of Scalia’s life” (does Dorf think I was trying to hasten his death?) “to turn 
Scalia into a Posner-style legal realist.” That’s absurd. I could no more have 
done that, and so would have wasted my time trying, than I could turn my cat 
into a dog. I would like my book to have some impact on the profession. But 
I know its impact will be slight, in part because of the complacency of some 
judges and more professors, in part because of certain immovable barriers to 
reform, such as the election of most state judges and the selection of federal 
judges by politicians (the President and Senators), and above all because of 
the stodginess of the profession. The profession marches forward, but with its 
head screwed on backward—transfi xed by an eighteenth-century Constitution 
of limited relevance to the twenty-fi rst century, by an antiquated vocabulary, 
by opaque verbal formulas (“actual innocence,” “rational basis,” “intermediate 
scrutiny,” “arbitrary and capricious,” “abuse of discretion,” and so on ad 
infi nitum), and by countless obsolete precedents.
I am surprised to fi nd Dorf saying that my describing “judges not as 
interpreters of legislation but as partners of the legislators” is “old hat.” The 
quoted passage has a context that he ignores. I say that “judges have been 
given the thankless task of ‘interpreting’ statutes that can’t be interpreted in 
many of the cases to which the statutes apply. Often there is no discernible 
legislative intent regarding potential cases within the statute’s semantic reach 
. . . . If the legislators did not foresee an issue arising under their statute 
that has become a subject of litigation, there isn’t anything to interpret . . . . 
Interpretation is recovery of meaning, and there is no meaning to recover in 
such cases.”5 The result is to make judges legislators. Old hat? Dorf’s known it 
forever? Or heresy? What would Scalia have said?
When Dorf discusses my criticisms of academic legal scholarship he turns 
defensive—he is after all himself a legal scholar. Yet I am surprised to fi nd him 
defending two very questionable books on constitutional law, by Professor 
Laurence Tribe (The Invisible Constitution) and Professor Akhil Amar (America’s 
Unwritten Constitution), respectively—both of which I have criticized sharply 
3. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds, 
20th ed. 2015). 
4. Purchase Bluebook Products, THE BLUEBOOK, https://www.legalbluebook.com/Purchase/
Products.aspx?op=Book (last visited August 6, 2016). Costs vary ranging from $38.50 for 
a print copy obtained from the Bluebook’s official website which states that bookstores 
charge $29. A one-year subscription to the online version is $36.
5. Id. at 112.
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in a book that Dorf does not mention6 and thus fails to rebut. Although 
he suggests implausibly that the Tribe and Amar books are read by judges, 
he doesn’t name any, and I’d be surprised if there were any except me—the 
unfriendly reader.
Dorf waxes particularly wroth at criticisms I level at two articles by 
Harvard Law Professor Richard Fallon. I quoted from the articles passages 
that I claimed and claim would be unintelligible to judges—and I now add, to 
lawyers and law students and many law professors as well. I quoted at length 
from the articles, and now I refer the readers of this response to my quotations 
for confi rmation of my criticisms.7 I imagine Dorf would respond that a select 
circle of law professors could understand Fallon’s articles, but I can’t see how 
the articles (which I do not mean to suggest are characteristic of the entire 
corpus of Fallon’s scholarly writing8) could be useful to the judiciary, or for 
that matter to legal education.
I never say, as Dorf supposes, that legal scholarship has no value for legal 
education, the judiciary, or the practice of law. But I do argue that its value for 
these enterprises is diminishing as legal scholarship, especially at the elite law 
schools, becomes ever more esoteric, as the faculties of those schools become 
ever more crowded with scholars whose fi rst loyalty is to other scholarly fi elds. 
Often those are fi elds in which they obtained advanced degrees yet realized 
that the chances of landing secure, well-paying academic jobs in those fi elds 
were slight—a development to which Dorf, in defending legal scholarship, 
does not allude.
He claims that I “want[s] academics to show that legal realism is correct,” 
an aim he deems “naïve.” No, I want academics to be realistic about judicial 
behavior—to grasp for example the degree to which judicial behavior deviates 
from the formalism that continues to be the offi  cial ideology of the judiciary, 
encapsulated in John Roberts’s absurd claim in his Senate confi rmation 
hearing that a Supreme Court Justice is the equivalent of an umpire or referee, 
who does not make rules but merely enforces the rules given to him. The 
critical fallacy in the remark is that an umpire or referee may infl uence but does 
not decide the outcome of the game (the side with more fouls may nevertheless 
win), but judges do decide the outcome of cases.
Dorf discusses legal realism at length in his “review,” describing me as a 
legal realist—a label I’m happy to wear—and, less accurately, as wishing to enlist 
academics to spread the realist gospel and “banish all vestiges of formalism”—a 
crusade I have never thought to embark on. His thoughts on legal realism do 
not appear to be coherent. On the one hand he quotes approvingly an article 
in which Brian Leiter, a prominent professor at the University of Chicago Law 
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 219-33 (2013).
7. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 43, 319-20.
8. As Dorf points out, I have cited several of Fallon’s articles—intelligible articles—in my 
opinions, and I admire Fallon’s very clearly written book, THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2013).
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School, declares that “we are all realists now,” and on the other hand he regards 
as quixotic what he imagines to be my crusade against—formalists, which if 
they don’t exist could not be the target of a crusade. A certain tendency to 
self-contradiction is illustrated by his unintentionally amusing statement that 
“Posner does have some good ideas about legal education, but even these 
seem half-baked.” Half-baked ideas are not good ideas.
One of my suggestions in Divergent Paths for reforming law school teaching 
was that civl procedure and evidence be treated as clinical courses—that instead 
of being taught as bodies of rules they be play-acted. The students, rather than 
immersing themselves in the rules of civil procedure or of evidence, would 
draft complaints and conduct depositions in their civil procedure course and 
conduct mock trials in their evidence course. (I taught such evidence courses 
at the University of Chicago Law School, using the superb case fi les of the 
Institute of Trial Advocacy, for several years in the early 1990s.) Dorf objects 
that such curricular changes would “raise cost questions” because “clinical and 
simulation course are more labor-intensive than Socratic or lecture courses” 
and would therefore require larger law school faculties and so greater expense. 
But he is wrong, because such teaching can be done better by adjuncts—
practicing lawyers or judges (me for example)—who receive slight and often 
no compensation, than by law professors who have no practical experience.
As for his suggestion that my criticisms of current legal-writing courses are 
“misinformed” because actually they enable students to “take poetic license, 
and their writing begins to fl ow,” I haven’t seen poetry in student writing or in 
judicial opinions, most of which are drafted by law clerks, most of whom are 
recent law school graduates. In fact, most law schools place little emphasis on 
writing skills; often a fi rst-year course in legal writing is the only such course. 
And although Dorf claims that legal-writing instructors discourage their 
students from resorting to legal jargon, it would be more accurate to say that 
some of the instructors try to discourage use of jargon, but judging from the 
number of jargon-ridden student law-review comments and judicial opinions, 
the instructors are rarely successful. I am appalled by his endorsement of 
the writing “systems,” taught in some law schools, called IRAC (Issue, 
Rule, Application, Conclusion) and CRAC (Conclusion, Rule, Application, 
Conclusion). Those are straitjackets. I am reminded of Holmes’s crack that “to 
rest upon a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death.”9
The crowning peculiarity of Dorf’s “review” is that it has very little to 
say about the judiciary. The subtitle of my book is “the academy and the 
judiciary,” and the judiciary (that is, the federal judiciary—I do not discuss 
state judiciaries, about which I know little) gets a good deal more attention 
in the book than the academy does. Yet apart from Judge Harry Edwards 
of the D.C. Circuit, I am the only living judge mentioned in Dorf’s article, 
and even his references to dead ones (mainly Holmes, Hand, and Friendly) 
are few. In a book of more than 400 pages I make a large number of specifi c 
9. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1915).
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criticisms (75, remember) of judicial practices and specifi c recommendations 
(48) for academic solutions; the vast majority both of the criticisms and of 
the suggested solutions Dorf ignores entirely. The reason I surmise is that as 
an academic his priority is to defend the academy from my barbs; he seems 
not very interested in the judiciary, in the quality of judicial appointments 
and judicial opinions, in the failures of judicial management and the lack of 
relevant diversity on the Supreme Court, and the numerous other criticisms 
of that and other courts that I deploy. His lack of interest in the judiciary 
confi rms my concern about the growing gap between the academy and the 
judiciary.
Enough; let me end with a fl ourish—an eff usive, very hard-to-believe, recent 
statement by Justice Kagan that illustrates the lack of realism that is one of the 
abetting sins of American law. After expressing her “boundless admiration and 
aff ection for Justice Scalia—‘I just loved Justice Scalia, and I miss him every 
day’” (could that be tongue in cheek?)—she remarks that she “would put this 
court as a whole up there with any court that the country has ever had in terms 
of the kind of legal skills, profi ciency and lawyerly aptitude that this court has 
. . . . Our court is in general a very, very, very lawyerly place . . . . It’s natural 
to have people who have spent lots of years of their lives thinking about legal 
analysis.”10 I would say rather that the current Court is a very political place, 
and that the Justices are defi cient in career diversity, defi cient in understanding 
science and technology, virtually bereft of trial experience, and underworked.
10. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Is Working Hard to Avoid Deadlocks, Kagan Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
4, 2016), www.nytimes. com/2016/04/05/ us/ politics/supreme-court-is-working-hard-to-
avoid-deadlocks-elena-kagan-says. h t  ml? _r=2. I can’t make sense of the last sentence of her 
statement.
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